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needed perform no further act, affirmative or otherwise, to extinguish the Pueblos' aboriginal water rights.
The court also explored the history of land and water rights under Mexican
and United States sovereignty, but, because the court concluded that the Spanish occupation extinguished the Pueblos' aboriginal rights, any effects on Indian
aboriginal water rights resulting from Mexican- or American government action
were moot.
Finally, the court decided the issue of whether the Winans doctrine applied
to any of the Pueblos' grant or trust lands. Wnans rights are recognized aboriginal rights which preserve pre-existing rights, establishing priority from "Lime
immemorial," i.e., before white settlement. The scope of a Winans right depends on actual use over an extended period of time. This right is not a function of land title, and the court determines such rights on a needs-based test
rather than a practicably irrigable acreage test.
Because the court concluded that the Spanish occupation extinguished the
Pueblos' aboriginal water rights, and thus there were no existing aboriginal water
rights for the United States to recognize, the court held that the Winans doctrine
did not apply to any of the Pueblos' grant or trust lands.
The U.S. District Court Judge adopted the recommendations of the magistrate in United States v. Abousleinan, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164733
(D.N.M. Sept., 30, 2017) and determined that the Pueblos did indeed possess
aboriginal water rights that predated Spanish occupation; however, that right
was extinguished under Spanish rule, and the Winjans doctrine did not apply to
the Pueblos' grant or trust lands.
Megan McCulloch
STATE COURTS
IDAHO
City of Blackfoot v. Spackman, 396 P.3d 1184 (Idaho 2017) (holding that:
(i) the City must file for transfer before using its water permit for groundwater
recharge; (ii) a settlement agreement with a private party does not allow the City
to use its permit for groundwater recharge or mitigation purposes affecting future groundwater rights; (iii) seepage from the City's water use cannot be a basis
for a claim of separate or expanded water right without transfer; and (iv) intervening parties were entitled to recover their attorney fees).
Currently, the City of Blackfoot (the "City") pumps water from the Blackfoot River and delivers it to irrigators east of 1-15. In order to save money on
the cost of operating and maintaining the pump, the City filed a water right application for pennit No. 27-12261 ("12261") to appropriate 9.71 cfs of groundwater from the Blackfoot River. The City wished to offset the injury resulting
from this appropriation with 1,066 alfa of mitigation credit resulting from seepage that occurs under Water Right No. 01-181C ("181C").
Under its "purpose of use" element, 181C allows for five different uses:
Irrigation Storage, Irrigation from Storage, Diversion to Storage, Recreation
Storage, and Irrigation. During the irrigation season, this element allows the
City to divert 2,466.80 afa from the Snake River to fill a recreation reservoir m
Jensen's Grove. From that diversion, 1,100 acre-feet travels to the reservoir for
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recreational storage, 980.9 acre-feet seep into the aquifer, and 186 acre-feet
evaporate. At the end of the season, the remaining 1,100 acre-feet seep into the
aquifer.
The other provisions element of 181 C states that the use and diversion of
water is subject to "additional conditions and limitations contained in a settlement agreement-IDWR transfer of water right. . . ." ("Settlement Agreement"). The Settlement Agreement states that the City "must file the appropriate application for pennit and/or transfer" if it wishes to use 181C for
groundwater recharge or mitigation purposes.
In its application for 12261, the City proposed using part of the seepage
described in 181C as mitigation for 12261. The application met protest from
the Coalition, comprising A&B Irrigation District, Burley Irrigation District,
American Falls Reservoir District #2, Minidoka Irrigation District, Milner Irrigation District, North Side Canal Company, and Twin Falls Canal Companythe intervenors in this case, who claimed that the City failed to establish that
12261 would not reduce the quantity of water under existing rights.
After holding an administrative hearing, the hearing officer determined that
that the proposed appropriation in 12261 was a constumptive use of water and
would reduce the quantity of water available under existing rights without mitigation. The hearing officer concluded that the City could not use 181C as mitigation for 12261 because 181C does not authorize the City to use the seepage
described in 181C for recharge. Despite this, the hearing officer approved
12261 on the condition that the City apply for transfer to add recharge as an
authorized purpose for 181C.
The City filed exceptions to the hearing officer's rulings, challenging the
requirement that it needs to apply for a transfer to add recharge as a purpose of
use before it can use 181C for mitigation. The Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources ("IDWR"), reviewed the City's exceptions and
agreed with the hearing officer that 181C does not authorize the City to use
water for recharge and a transfer would be required to authorize such use. However, the Director disagreed with the hearing officer's grant of conditional approval and denied the application for 12261 without prejudice, suggesting the
City could refile its application for 12261 in conjunction with a transfer application for 181C.
Following the Director's order, the City filed a petition with the district
court asserting that the Director's ruling was contrary to law. After permitting
the Coalition to appear as intervenors, the court held a hearing on the City's
petition. The Bingham County District Court found that the plain unambiguous language of 181C's "purpose of use" element does not authorize the City
to use water for recharge, and if the City wanted to use 181C as mitigation for
12261, it would have to file a transfer. The City appealed.
The Court first addressed whether the City must file for a transfer before it
can use 181 C for mitigation or recharge. If a decree's terms are unambiguous,
the Court will determine the meaning and legal effect of the decree from the
plain and ordinary meaning of its words. Whether ambiguity exists in a decree
"is a question of law, over which this Court exercises free review."
Water rights are defined by elements, and Idaho Code sections 42-1411(2)
and 42-1411(3) include a list of elements that deline a water right Under Idaho
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Code section 42-1412(6), a water decree "shall contain or incorporate a statement of each element of a water right as stated in subsections (2) and (3) of section 42-1411, Idaho Code, as applicable." "Purpose of use" is one of those
defining elements. Thus, a water decree must either contain a statement of
purpose of use or incorporate one, but not both.
There is no reference to an incorporated statement in the "purpose of use"
element, but 181C contains a clear statement that provides water may be used
for: (1) Irrigation Storage; (2) Irrigation from Storage; (3) Diversion to Storage;
(4) Recreation Storage; and (5) Irrigation. Recharge is not listed as a use of
181C. The City's argument that recharge is an authorized use of 181C does
not stand because it is a statutorily recognized beneficial use and therefore must
be included in the "purpose of use" element to be recognized.
The history of this water right, as the district court suggested, supports the
denial of recharge being an authorized use. Water Right 181C was acquired by
the City in 2005 to fill and maintain the reservoir at Jensen Grove. The City
filed an application for transfer with the IDWR and sought to add recreation,
storage, and recharge as authorized uses in addition to the original use of irrigation. In 2007, the Director approved irrigation, storage, and recreation but did
not approve recharge as an authorized use. If the City wished to remedy this,
it needed to abide by the administrative requirements, but it did not make an
effort to do so. In May of 2009, the district court entered a PaialDecree for
the right in the Snake River Basin Adjudication, which did not include the right
to recharge. The City could have objected to the denial of the recharge right or
appealed the decision of the district court, but it did not seek either of these
remedies.
The Court determined that the City must file an application for transfer to
change the purpose or nature of a use of water right under Idaho Code § 42222(1) and that the City's claims that recharge is an authorized use under the
purpose of use element of 181C were unfounded.
The Court next addressed whether the Settlement agreement added recharge as an authorized use of water under 181C. The City argued that the
plain language, "to use 181C for groundwater recharge or mitigation purposes
associated with future groundwater rights" authorizes the use. The Court disagreed with this argument because a private settlement cannot define, add, or
subtract from the elements of a validly adjudicated water right.
The City next argued that the Settlement Agreement, as a document incorporated under the other provisions element of 181C, must be "construed along
with the rest of 181 C" and may affect all the elements of 181 C and, specifically,
may add recharge to the purpose of use element. The Court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, it flies in the face of Idaho statute, which only allows
an element to either contain a statement defining the element or incorporate a
statement that defines the element. The City's argument would allow both,
which is impermissible under the language and would muddy the decree. Second, an adjudicated water right is a judicially decreed property right and binds
the IDWR. The IDWR was not a party to the settlement agreement, and therefore, the Director is not bound by the Settlement Agreement and has no duty
to enforce it This is made clear by the language incorporating the Settlement
Agreement into the other provisions element of 181C: "The diversion and use
of water under transfer 72385 is subject to additional conditions and limitations
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contained in a settlement agreement ... the settlement agreement is recorded
in Bingham county [ and Bonneville county [ and is enforceable by the parties
thereto."
Consequently, the Settlement Agreement cannot define, add, or subtract
from the defining elements of 181C. It can only provide "additional conditions
and limitations" on the exercise of 181C. To allow the Settlement Agreement
to enlarge or otherwise alter the clearly decreed elements of 181C would allow
private parties to alter a judicial decree.
The Court then determined if the circumstances demonstrate mitigation
for 12261 regardless of the elements of 181 C. The City argued that incidental
recharge occurs from the seepage each year at the Jensen reservoir, and therefore, recharge should be an authorized use of 181C without filing a transfer.
However, the Court held that recharge is a statutorily recognized beneficial use
which must be identified under the purpose of use element of a water
right. Water right 181C does not include recharge, and incidental recharge cannot be used to claim or expand that water right. Accordingly, without a transfer
approving recharge as a beneficial use, any seepage that occurs under 181C is
incidental recharge and not eligible to be used for mitigation purposes.
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court ruling that the plain
unambiguous language of 181C's purpose of use element does not authorize
the City to use water for recharge and if the City wanted to use 181C as mitigation for 12261 it would have to file a transfer.
Natalie Norcutt
MONTANA

In re Scott Ranch, LLC, 402 P.3d 1207 (Mont 2017) (holding that: (i) water
rights claims were recognized under state law, not as a federally reserved water
right established under the Crow compact; and (ii) the water court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the water rights claims, which should instead be filed with
the Department of Natural Resources and Environment under the exempt
claims filing procedure pursuant to the revised statute).
Scott Ranch is a Montana limited liability company owned by three nonIndian siblings that acquired Indian allotment lands in Big Horn County within
the Crow Indian Reservation ("Crow Reservation") in Montana. The lands
were previously held in trust by the United States for the benefit of Thor Lande,
a member of the Crow Tribe who was an allottee of the Crow Reservation's
federally reserved water right Lande passed away in 1997, and the United
States issued fee patents and converted the lands to fee status in 2006. Scott
Ranch purchased the lands from an heir of Lande in 2010 and 2012.
In July of 2016, Scott Ranch filed for adjudication of existing water rights in
the water court, asserting all of its forty-seven claims were exempt from the filing
requirements of sections 85-2-221 and -222 of the Montana Constitution. Scott
Ranch claimed that its water rights were not available for state adjudication until
2006 when the fee patents were issued, and it filed the petition on the ground
that the recent issuance of fee patents created a unique set of facts that prevented
it or its predecessors-in-interest fron seeking adjudication until now. Scott
Ranch additionally claimed that it possessed " Walton" rights, water rights held
by a non-Indian successor to allotment lands derived from the allottee's share

